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A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, In re
Hfohorst, 15o U. S. 653, renderedin December 1893, islikelyto cause
some trouble in the Federal courts regarding jurisdiction of parties
in patent cases. The question involves the construction of the
law of 1887, chap. 373, sec. x, as amended by that of 1888, chap.
866, see. i, and the point in issue is whether, under these laws,
suit can be brought in the U. S. courts, in a patent case, in any
other district than that whereof the defendant is an inhabitant.
The section, after reciting the concurrent and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Federal courts, provides that "no civil suit shall be
brought before either of said (i. e., District or Circuit) courts
against any person by any original process or proceeding in any
other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant." The
Supreme Court has decided that the earlier laws of 1789 and
1875, which are on this point substantially the same as those of
1887 and 1888, applied to all suits, including patent suits. (Chafee
v. Hfayward, 2o How. 2o8; Butterworth v. Hfill, 114 U. S. 1:28).
These laws of 1887 and i888 have frequently been applied to
patent cases, and there has been apparently no objection raised
to this application of the laws. But in the case cited at the
beginning of this note (In re Hohorst), the Supreme Court appears
to have taken up a different position. The suit was for the
infringement of a patent, and the defendant, an alien corporation,
demurred to the bill on the ground that the Circuit Court had no
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. The Supreme Court
decided against the 'defendant, and in the opinion discussed the con-
struction of the section of the Act in question. After pointing
out that in patent cases the jurisdiction of the United States courts
depends on the subject matter and not on the parties, the Court
argues as follows: I. That by statutes in force at the time of the
passing of the Acts of 1887 and x888, the United States courts had
original jurisdiction, exclusive of State courts, over patent cases,
without regard to amount or value. II. That the section now
in question speaks, at the outset, of only so much of the civil jurisdic-
tion of the Circuit courts of the Uuited States as is concurrent
with the State courts, and concerning matters in dispute exceed-
ing $2000 in value. III. That the grant in this section to the
Circuit Court of jurisdiction arising generally "under the Con-
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stitution and laws of the United States," does not affect the
jurisdiction granted by earlier statutes over specified cases of that
class. The Court concludes: "If the clause of this section,
defining the district in which suit shall be brought, is applicable
to patent cases, the clause limiting the jurisdiction to matters of
a certain amount or value must be held to be equally applicable,
with the result that no court of the country, national or state,
would have jurisdiction of patent suits involving a less amount or
value. It is impossible to adopt a construction which necessarily
leads to such a result." The effect of this decision would seem to
be that a patent suit can be brought in the Circuit Court of any
district in which the defendant can be found and served with
process.
On the subject of construction of statutes, it may be interest-
ing to point out the various ways in which the Supreme Court of
the United States has expressed itself at different times as to the
means which may be employed to aid in the construction of
statutes of uncertain import. Thus, in Preston v. Browder, 1
Wheat. 121 (i816), the Court say that it is frequently necessary
to recur to the history and shadom of the country to ascertain the
reason as well as the meaning of statutes. In Aldridge v. Williams,
3 How. 24 (1845), Ch. J. Taney, after stating that the Court could
not be influenced by the construction placed upon a law by the
individual members of Congress in the debate, nor by their
motives or reasons in supporting or opposing amendments, con-
tinues: " The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both
houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the
Act itself, and we must gather the intention from the language
there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the
laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the
public history of the times in which it was passed." In Blake v.
Nrat. Ban k, 23 Wall. 307 (1874), an apparently contradictory and
badly expressed enactment was interpreted by a reference to the
Journals of Congress. In U. S. v. Union Pacific _R. _?., 91 U. S.
79 (I875), the Court substantially adopted the rules of construc-
tion laid down by Ch. J. Taney, excluding the views of individual
members in debate, and the motives which influenced them in
their votes, and stating that the Act itself speaks the will of Con-
gress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used, and
that the Court may recur to the history of the times to find the
reason and meaning of particular provisions. In Jennison v. Zirk,
98 U. S. 459 (1878), the Court, after giving a sketch of the
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speech of a member in Congress, advocating the passage of an
Act, say: "These statements of the author of the Act in advo-
cating its adoption cannot of course control its construction where
there is doubt as to its meaning, but they show the condition of
mining property in the public lands of the United States, and thus
serve to indicate the probable intention of Congress in the passage
of the Act." In Am. Net and Twine Co. v. Worthington, I4I U. S.
473 (1891), the Court, repeating that statements and opinions of
the promoters of the Act in the legislative body are inadmissible
as bearing on its construction, say that reference to the proceed-
ings of the body may be made to inform the Court of the
exigencies of the fishing interests, and the reasons for fixing the
duty at a certain amount. The report of the Senate Committee
on Education and Labor, recommending the passage of the bill,
is quoted by the Court in Holyv Trinity Church v. U. S., 143 U. S.
464 (189i), as throwing light on the intention of Congress in pass-
ing it. This latter case has apparently not always been under-
stood, for the Court, in In re Downing, 56 Fed. Rep. 470 (1893),
referring to it, say: "The case of Hoy Trinity Church v. U. S.
was apparently pressed upon its (the Court's) attention as an
authority for permitting courts to discard the language of a
statute, and interpret its purpose by the supposed intention of the
law-makers, gathered from general considerations of justice or
expediency. That adjudication, according to our experience, has
been invariably cited where the effort has been made to induce
this Court to legislate and substitute its own notions of what the
law should be for the plainly expressed will of the legislative
body. We do not understand, however, that it sanctions any new
rules of statutory interpretation." From the foregoing examina-
tion of cases, it would seem that while the remarks of individual
members and the proceedings of the legislature as a body cannot
be referred to as a guide to the construction of an Act, they may
sometimes be taken into account as a means of informing the
Court of collateral facts and circumstances which .may tend to
show more clearly the condition of public affairs that the Act was
designed to ameliorate. Or, in other words, they would be
referred to only as a means (to use the language of the earlier
statements of the Supreme Court) of recurring to "the situation
and history of the country" in their relation to the Act under
consideration.
Does a parol promise by a mortgagor to pay the mortgage tax
invalidate the written stipulations for interest contained in the
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note and mortgage ? The decision of this question, teeming as it
does with momentous consequences to both borrowers and lenders,
into which two classes the whole human race may perhaps be
properly divided, was recently rendered by the Supreme Court of
California in the case of Dow v. Niles et at. The Court held, with
three of the five justices dissenting, that a decree 'in the affirm-
ative would invite "more or less falsehood and perjury, and result
in some instances in the grossest injustice "; that the person whose
needs compelled him to borrow would in nowise be protected from
the avarice of the lender, who, accustomed as he is to the business
of lending money and fully armed with knowledge in protecting
his interests in securities, would never take a written or verbal
contract for the payment of the mortgage tax because he would
know the contract to be void because of the violation of the pro-
vision in the State Constitution to that effect (Section 5 of Article
13). And the verbal promise, if proved, could not possibly have
had any force or validity and thus of no advantage to the mortga-
gee or disadvantage to the mortgagor. The opinion was further
expressed that, as there is no limit imposed by the laws or Consti-
tution of the State, any risk additional which the lender must run
would only increase the rate of interest, which of course must
operate adversely to the interests of the borrower. Reference is
also made in the opinion of the Chief Justice, to the case of Bur-
6ridge v. Lemmert, in which the fact that the agreement to pay the
taxes on the mortgagee's interest was in writing, decided the case
in the opposite way, i. e., in favor of the mortgagor, while in the
case under discussion it was parol. Thus the decree was in con.
formity with the general rule that parol evidence is inadmissible
to add to, contradict, or vary the terms of a written agreement;
and also with the intention to proceed in conformity with the
view expressed by the framers of the Constitution in the various
provisions relating to the subject.
